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A transgender person faces obstacles trying to negotiate a gender-binary
world. Going through a TSA checkpoint is no different. A substantial number of
transgender persons have reported that they were detained and examined because they were transgender.1 Why this situation persists and what policy reforms
should be implemented to alleviate it are the subjects of this Essay. This Essay is
devoted mainly to the theme of transgender rights, rather than race, a central
theme of the symposium in which this Essay appears. Given the relatively small
pool of transgender individuals for whom data is available, this Essay is unable
to make meaningful conclusions about whether and, to what extent, race plays a
role in this analysis. This Essay does, however, conclude by sharing some brief
reflections about how race, if explored in future scholarship, could figure in the
treatment of transgender persons at TSA check points. This Essay will make suggestions about the role of disparate impact analysis and racial stereotypes to that
end.
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SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE
2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY (2016) 1, 221, https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/d
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THE PROBLEM: BINARY TECHNOLOGY FOR A NONBINARY WORLD

A chief reason why transgender people are frequently detained is owing to
the TSA’s policy governing full-body scanners.2 “Before a person steps into the
full-body scanner at an airport,” the TSA officer first must make a visual determination about the person’s gender.3 After making the determination, the
TSA officer will press the button on his console to indicate whether the person
is female or male.4 Making the right call is crucial.5 The body scanner is programmed to look for penises on passengers whom the TSA officer has identified as male and breasts on passengers whom the officer has identified as female.6
Thus programmed, the body scanner poses unique problems for a
transgender person whose genitalia does not correspond to the gender that the
TSA officer has ascribed to that person.7 Suppose the TSA officer selects the
female button for a transgender person whom the TSA officer regards as female. Unbeknownst to the TSA officer, however, the transgender person has a
penis. But since the scanner was never programmed to detect a penis on a person whom the TSA officer has tagged as female, the scanner will misidentify
the male appendage on the transgender person as a suspicious object meriting
further investigation.8 Once the scanner alerts the TSA officer about the anomalous object, the TSA officer is obliged to begin a series of physical examinations of the transgender person.9 The TSA officer must initially pat-down the
transgender person, and, if warranted, the TSA officer may lead the transgender
person to a private room for a more extensive review.10 In the private room, the
TSA officer might require the transgender person to remove the latter’s clothing and expose the person’s genitalia.11 Despite reports that such searches occur, Jenny Burke, the TSA press secretary, has said that “the agency does not

2

Id. at 223 n.4.
Lucas Waldron & Brenda Medina, When Transgender Travelers Walk into Scanners, Invasive Searches Sometimes Wait on the Other Side, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 26, 2019, 5:00 AM), htt
ps://www.propublica.org/article/tsa-transgender-travelers-scanners-invasive-searches-oftenwait-on-the-other-side [perma.cc/42LG-TGHL].
4
Id.; Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 4, Erway v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., No.
5:20-CV-141 (E.D.N.C 2020) https://tsaoutofourpants.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/erwayv.-tsa-complaint-filed.pdf [perma.cc/WB5V-T9DG].
5
See Waldron & Medina, supra note 3.
6
Id.; Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 4.
7
See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 4; Waldron & Medina, supra
note 3.
8
Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4; Waldron & Medina, supra note 3.
9
Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 5; Transgender Passengers, TRANSP.
SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/transgender-passengers [perma.cc/HB8M-4MSR].
10
Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 5; Waldron & Medina, supra note 3.
11
Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 5; Waldron & Medina, supra note 3.
3

21 NEV. L.J. 1061

Spring 2021]

ANOMALOUS ANATOMIES

1063

conduct strip searches, but that travelers may be required to ‘adjust clothing’
during the pat-downs.”12
In 2019, ProPublica published a story describing the experiences of several
transgender people who have undergone such searches.13 One person interviewed by ProPublica was Olivia, a thirty-six-year-old who declined to provide
her full name for fear of outing herself.14 Olivia entered a body scanner at the
Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport on September 15, 2017.15 A
TSA officer informed Olivia that the scanner had detected an anomaly, and a
pat-down was required.16 Because she appeared female but possessed a penis,
Olivia was accustomed to pat-downs at TSA checkpoints.17 But this time her
experience would be different. The TSA officer patted down Olivia and tested
her hands for explosive residue.18 Instead of ending the search at that point, the
officer told Olivia that she must go to a private room for further examination.19
There, a TSA officer again patted her down, “running her hands down Olivia’s
legs and over her groin.”20 “I told her,” Olivia explained, “If the issue is what
you are feeling, let me tell you what this is. It is my penis.”21 Three additional
TSA officers entered the room.22 All of the officers were women, but they
would not be permitted to examine Olivia.23 For federal law requires TSA to
have an officer of the same gender search the passenger.24 Because Oliva’s
anatomy was seen as male by the TSA, she would have to be searched by a
male officer.25 Olivia refused to be searched by a male officer, and she was denied permission to board her flight.26 She “started crying and pleaded with the
officers. ‘Can I just show you?’ she recalled asking them.”27 According to
ProPublica, “TSA officers aren’t supposed to allow passengers to remove undergarments. But Olivia said the officers in the room with her did not object
when Olivia pulled her ruffled, black and white skirt and underwear down to
her ankles.”28 TSA then permitted her to continue to her gate.29 Olivia is not
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Waldron & Medina, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Transgender Passengers, supra note 9.
Waldron & Medina, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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alone in experiencing difficulties at the airport. From January 2016 to April
2019, the TSA received 298 complaints relating to the screening of transgender
people.30 The number amounted to 5 percent of all complaints during that time,
an especially significant number considering that transgender persons are only
1 percent of the population.31 Yet this number may not reflect the extent of the
problem. Among the 174 respondents who replied to ProPublica, just fourteen
filed a complaint with TSA.32 “Many of those who did not file complaints said
they didn’t know how, were afraid of outing themselves or didn’t want to relive
the experience.”33
The results of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, the largest survey examining the experiences of transgender people in the United States, are relevant in
this context.34 The survey included responses by 27,715 transgender people
from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto
Rico, and U.S. military bases overseas.35 The survey revealed that “[o]ne in ten
(10%) of those who were out to their immediate family reported that a family
member was violent towards them because they were transgender, and 8% were
kicked out of the house because they were transgender.”36 Further, “[t]he majority of respondents who were out or perceived as transgender while in school
(K-12) experienced some form of mistreatment, including being verbally harassed (54%), physically attacked (24%), and sexually assaulted (13%) because
they were transgender.”37 One more statistic deserves mention: “[i]n the year
prior to completing the survey, 30% of respondents who had a job reported being fired, denied a promotion, or experiencing some other form of mistreatment
in the workplace due to their gender identity or expression, such as being verbally harassed or physically or sexually assaulted at work.”38 Of the respondents who had gone through airport security in the past year, 43 percent, protected by the survey’s anonymity, reported having “at least one problem related to
their gender identity or expression.”39
Alex Marzano-Lesnevich, a professor at Bowdoin College, provides a
poignant description of their ordeal. Identifying as “genderqueer,” MarzanoLesnevich describes themselves in these terms:40 “[m]y hair is clipped to a fade.
30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 221.
40
In their article, Marzano-Lesnevich refers to themselves using a gender-neutral plural
pronoun. The Essay honors this preference. Alex Marzano-Lesnevich, Flying While Trans,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/opinion/tsa-transgender.h
tml [perma.cc/P855-J5ME].
31
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My shoulders have started to thicken from barbell presses. Even without a
binder, my chest is flat. I am often called ‘sir,’ particularly in airports . . . . But
I am more often called ‘ma’am.’ I have a soft jawline and curved hips.”41 Given
their anatomy, Marzano-Lesnevich was detained at the TSA checkpoint in Boston Logan International Airport in 2019.42 Here is Marzano-Lesnevich’s account: “. . . I heard the T.S.A. agent shout, ‘I think we pressed the wrong button!’ He had shouted so loudly, I assumed he was talking about someone else.
But then he spoke again, directly to me, avoiding my gaze. ‘Go through again,’
he said.”43
Marzano-Lesnevich continued: “The long line behind me halted as I
walked back into the scanner and assumed the position: arms up, legs spread. I
waited, painfully aware that the others [sic] passengers were staring at me. Did
they know what was happening? Did they know what the agent meant by ‘the
button?’ ”44
That Marzano-Lesnevich felt acute embarrassment was nearly inevitable:
“When the machine had finished its second scan, I stepped out and waited” and
“I found myself looking more closely at my fellow passengers.”45
Such experiences indicate how the procedures adopted by the TSA fail to
accommodate transgender individuals. Indeed, the screening process poses
problems not only for transgender passengers but for TSA officers themselves.
ProPublica reports that a TSA employee, who has worked for the agency for
over a decade and spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that the gender
buttons are stressful for both passengers and officers: “ ‘A lot of the traveling
public already hate us,’ she said. ‘We don’t want to offend people by [scanning
them] wrong.’ ”46
Thus, it is in the interest of everyone involved in the TSA screening process that the process is reformed. As Marzano-Lesnevich remarked of their own
experience: I noticed how “the agent[] . . . looked as miserable and uncomfortable as I felt.”47
Until reforms are implemented, one would imagine that lawsuits will be
filed against the TSA. Tellingly, however, almost no such suits exist. The absence may very well be a tacit admission by transgender people that they fear
being outed or having to endure the torment of recounting in court what they
had already suffered at the airport. One exception is the suit filed by the sixteen-year-old Jamii Erway. Jamii was born male but identifies as female.48 In
2019, Jamii, along with her mother, Kimberly, checked into Raleigh-Durham
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Waldron & Medina, supra note 3.
Marzano-Lesnevich, supra note 40.
Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4.
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International Airport in North Carolina.49 As Jamii approached the TSA body
scanner, the TSA officer, upon initial visual inspection, had identified her as
female.50 The officer accordingly pressed the button for a female scan.51 Because the officer had scanned for a female, the scanner alerted the officer that
Jamii’s anatomy did not correspond to a typical female.52 The officer told Jamii
that she would have to “submit to a strip search in a private room whereby [the
officer] would inspect the child’s genitals.”53 According to the officer, the TSA
body scanner found something anomalous in Jamii’s anatomy.54 When Jamii
entered a TSA body scanner, “a ‘false positive’ alert indicated that the scanner
detected an anomaly on her groin.”55 The “anomaly” on Jamii’s groin was neither a concealed weapon nor any other item forbidden by TSA guidelines; rather, it was Jamii’s penis.56 Although, as the lawsuit claims, “TSA procedure
for resolving such anomalies is to conduct a brief pat-down search,” the TSA
officer screening Jamii asked her to submit to a strip search.57 The TSA officer
reportedly told Jamii “that she was not free to leave until she submitted to such
a search.”58
As one can imagine, such intrusion could cause the transgender person, especially a sixteen-year-old, abundant humiliation and anguish. Jamii claimed
that she had suffered a psychological injury, “including symptoms of panic,
anxiety, fear, racing heart, shortness of breath, uncontrollable shaking, and nausea.”59 Owing to her emotional distress, she states that she has been unable to
fly even though she had flown “several times per year” in the past.60 In addition
to the civil suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the TSA,
Jamii also sued TSA’s officer for violating her Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure.61 The lawsuit states that, in doing so, the TSA
officer acted “in violation of TSA policy, the Fourth Amendment, and state law
rights of [Jamii], and the boundaries of civil and decent society.”62
An argument that was omitted from Jamii’s complaint was whether the
TSA’s policy has the effect of violating her right to define who she wants to

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3, 4.
Id. at 1 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7, 8.
Id. at 2.
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be—what some might call her right of privacy or personhood.63 The next section will examine this alternative claim and why it matters.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
The narratives told by Jamii, Olivia, and Marzano-Lesnevich involve issues related to the Fourth Amendment. Namely, the TSA may not violate the
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
Fourth Amendment, the government must generally show that there was a warrant for the search or that there existed individualized suspicion.64 However, the
Supreme Court has created an exception for administrative searches.65 The
Court explained that “where the risk to public safety is substantial and real,
blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—
for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and
other official buildings.”66 In Part IV, this Essay will examine what the administrative search entails and how the unique circumstances of transgender people
relate to it. Presently, what will be discussed is the larger normative principle
that is at stake in the TSA’s policy toward transgender people. The searches
conducted by the TSA implicate not only the Fourth Amendment but a right
that is more directly relevant to a transgender person’s life as a whole: the right
to be able to define her gender. It is probably not the intent of the TSA to implement policies that are meant to deter transgender people from adopting the
gender of their choice. However, the effect of the TSA’s procedures can
amount to the same. Suppose Andie, a person contemplating transitioning into
her true gender, travels several times on airlines for business and to visit family. Andie obtains information like that supplied by Olivia, Jamii, and MarzanoLesnevich. Andie reads about how transgender people face the prospect that an
invasive body search—with all its attendant psychological torment—can occur
regularly. She reads about how a transgender person is patted down in her most
intimate parts and then taken to a private room for questioning, further patdowns, and then possibly a strip search. For Andie, the prospect of such governmental intrusion may be enough to dissuade her from transitioning to a gender that is authentic to her.

63

See infra Part II.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000); Petersen v. City of Mesa, 83 P.3d 35, 38 (Ariz. 2004); Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
65
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997); see also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47–48 (“Our
holding also does not affect the validity of border searches or searches at places like airports
and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be
particularly acute.”); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (approving of lower court decisions upholding airport screening searches where there was no
reason for suspicion).
66
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
64
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Given the vital role of gender in one’s identity, one can argue that the Supreme Court should recognize a fundamental right to choose one’s gender
without fear of government coercion.67 The issue of Fourth Amendment search
and seizure presented by the TSA’s policies is therefore bound up with the issue of substantive due process.68 In 1928, Justice Brandeis penned a famous
dissent in Olmstead v. United States. He stated that the right of privacy, as applied against the government, is “the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”69 As Jamii had
done in her legal complaint, Justice Brandeis was referring to the Fourth
Amendment.70 What Justice Brandeis meant by the right of privacy is intentionally ambiguous, however, and it has assumed varied expression in the Constitution.71 The word “privacy” does not appear anywhere in Jamii’s legal complaint. Yet it is the right of privacy that is at the heart of her grievance. For a
transgender person’s chief desire is to be afforded a domain of privacy in which
the government is forbidden from unduly coercing her to become someone she
does not want to be. In this sense, the right of privacy that belongs to a
transgender person does not differ from the same right as applied to a cultural
conservative who condemns transgender people. Such a conservative, after all,
also longs to be free of government coercion as he tries to define his identity.
The conservative will likely want to exercise those constitutional rights which
can be organized under the broad canopy of the right of privacy mentioned by
Justice Brandeis. These include the rights to assembly,72 association,73 and
speech74 (which also encompasses the right to obtain information).75 By exercising these rights, the conservative can develop and refine how he understands
his identity and how he wishes to present it to others. In exercising each of
these rights, the conservative is also expressing his desire “to be let alone” by
the government. A person yearning to change her gender may wish for the
same. However, unlike a cultural conservative, a transgender person’s desire
67

For further discussion of the degree to which gender is vital, see infra notes 86–97 and
accompanying text.
68
Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L.
REV. 977, 1004 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right”
That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1896–97 (2004).
69
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
70
Id.
71
See the Court’s opinion in Griswold, pointing to various places where the right of privacy
is found. Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479, 483, 484–85 (1965).
72
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
73
Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 644 (2000); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 430 (1963).
74
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
75
Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867
(1982); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969).
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for transformation will often involve surgery or at least significant changes in
physiognomy.76 The right of privacy—the “right to be let alone”—for a
transgender person thus logically entails the exercise of an additional right: the
right to control one’s body.
There is a line of Supreme Court cases that have established a right to control one’s body as a means to determine one’s identity. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a law that forbade people from using contraceptives.77 Griswold recognized a “zone of privacy” in the Constitution, one that
was capacious enough to protect the right of married couples to obtain contraceptives.78 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglass remarked: “Would we allow
the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs
of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”79 Suggested in these words is an implicit connection between bodily autonomy and the right of self-definition.
While marriage does not necessarily entail childbirth, the former is by convention associated with the latter. Contraceptives permit married couples to decide
how to define their families by limiting when and, if, to produce children, and
how many. Griswold argued that permitting the police “to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms” was “repulsive to the notions of privacy.”80
Permitting TSA agents to engage in bodily searches of transgender people is no
less repulsive to notions of privacy. Indeed, whereas the Griswold Court describes police entering the bedrooms of couples, the TSA takes the more literal
approach by invading the bodies of transgender people, sometimes forcing
them to strip naked to reveal their sex. The Court, moreover, made clear in its
subsequent holding in Eistenstadt v. Baird that the right of privacy was not limited to marital couples but applied to the individual.81 “If the right of privacy
means anything,” the Court asserted in Eisenstadt, “it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.”82 A person, regardless of marital status, is protected by the
Constitution from government control of her body so that she may make decisions about whether, when, and how often she wishes to become a parent. Eisenstadt held that such a decision “fundamentally affect[ed] a person,” and one
can say something similar about the desire to fulfill the demands of one’s authentic gender identity.83
76

JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 99–103; Jae M. Sevelius, Gender Affirmation: A Framework for Conceptualizing Risk Behavior Among Transgender Women of Color, 68 SEX
ROLES 675, 684 (2013).
77
Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479, 483, 484–85 (1965).
78
Id. at 486.
79
Id. at 485–86.
80
Id.
81
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
82
Id.
83
See id.
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In 1973, the Supreme Court rendered a philosophically consonant holding
to Eisenstadt in Roe v. Wade.84 The Roe Court asserted that a woman has a fundamental right to an abortion.85 Writing the Court’s opinion, Justice Blackmun
emphasized the suffering that a woman would endure if the government prevented her from exercising the right to an abortion: “The detriment that the
State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.”86 Most notably, a woman, against her will, would be compelled
to adopt the identity of a mother. Justice Blackmun elaborated: “Maternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.
Psychological harm may be imminent.”87 The right of abortion is therefore
analogous to the right of a person to determine her gender identity. The pregnant woman, if denied the right of abortion may suffer a “distressful life” and
“[p]sychological harm may be imminent.”88 A person contemplating transitioning into a gender other than the one she was born into may also confront such
harm if she is coerced by the government against transitioning. The policies
employed by the TSA place transgender people between a rock and a hard
place. Transgender people can either suffer the ceremony of humiliation that is
frequently enacted by the TSA, or transgender people can refrain from undergoing measures to transform their given gender.
The latter option is more than an inconvenience. There is empirical evidence to suggest that individuals who elect to transform their gender do so because they experience gender dysphoria.89 This is a medical condition that, according to the American Psychiatric Association, “involves a conflict between
a person’s physical or assigned gender and the gender with which he/she/they
identify.”90 Transgender people who are unable to adopt the gender with which
they identify “may often experience significant distress and/or problems functioning associated with this conflict between the way they feel and think of
themselves . . . and their physical or assigned gender.”91 A study published in
the American Academy of Pediatrics demonstrates the toll that untreated gender
dysphoria can have on transgender individuals and, in particular, transgender
youth.92 The study addresses how “puberty suppression,” a treatment for gender
dysphoria, affects suicidality in transgender people, and it establishes that
“[t]here is a significant inverse association between treatment with pubertal
84

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159, 164–66 (1973).
Id. at 153.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Tim C. van de Grift et al., Effects of Medical Interventions on Gender Dysphoria and
Body Image: A Follow-Up Study, 79 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 815, 815, 817 (2017).
90
What Is Gender Dysphoria?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/patient
s-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria [perma.cc/H9UM-AUY3].
91
Id.
92
Jack L. Turban et al., Pubertal Suppression for Transgender Youth and Risk of Suicidal
Ideation, 145 PEDIATRICS, Mar. 2020 at 1, 2, 8.
85
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suppression during adolescence and lifetime suicidal ideation among
transgender adults whoever wanted this treatment.”93 It is possible that the profound distress that transgender people derive from gender dysphoria can be so
severe as to develop into suicidal ideation.94 Another study, published in the
American Journal of Psychiatry, examines the psychological effects of “gender-affirming surgery.”95 This type of surgery refers “to all surgical procedures
that a patient wishes to undergo in an attempt to become as similar as possible
to the desired gender” and thus reduce gender dysphoria.96 The American Journal of Psychiatry study found that, while individuals who suffer from gender
dysphoria
were about six times as likely to have had a mood and anxiety disorder health
care visit, more than three times as likely to have received prescriptions for antidepressants and anxiolytics, and more than six times as likely to have been hospitalized after a suicide attempt[,] . . . increased time since last gender-affirming
surgery was associated with reduced mental health treatment.97

Transgender people can mitigate the psychological harm inflicted by gender dysphoria by receiving treatments that allow them to adopt the gender with
which they identify. However, if the TSA persists in unusually invasive searches, a person contemplating gender-affirming surgery may be dissuaded from
choosing it or completing it, thereby rendering the person more susceptible to
anguish and hopelessness.
Justice Blackmun mentioned in Roe that “[p]sychological harm may be
imminent.”98 The language of psychological harm in Roe highlights the injuries
that a woman can suffer from being denied a fundamental right to control her
body. The Court has also explained in terms other than suffering how such a
right can empower a person to realize who she wishes to be. In Casey v.
Planned Parenthood, the Court reaffirmed a woman’s right to an abortion.99 A
plurality opinion justified the decision in the following terms:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is

93

Id. at 1–2, 6.
Id. at 5; Claire M. Peterson et al., Suicidality, Self-Harm, and Body Dissatisfaction in
Transgender Adolescents and Emerging Adults with Gender Dysphoria, 47 SUICIDE & LIFETHREATENING BEHAV. 475, 475 (2017).
95
Richard Bränström & John E. Pachankis, Reduction in Mental Health Treatment Utilization Among Transgender Individuals After Gender-Affirming Surgeries: A Total Population
Study, 177 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 727, 727–28 (2020).
96
Marta R. Bizic et al., Gender Dysphoria: Bioethical Aspects of Medical Treatment,
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the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life.100

Importantly, the plurality in Casey reiterated that “[b]eliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.”101 The plurality’s words in Casey can apply to the
right of transgender people as well. For, surely, the right to fulfill the demands
of her true gender also “involv[es] the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy . . . .”102 If the right to determine whether one wishes to become a mother
involves the right to “define one’s own concept of existence” and “the mystery
of human life,” the right to define one’s gender is no different.103
One may object that Casey, like Roe, involves the right of reproductive
freedom, and thus differs from the right of self-definition sought by transgender
people. The Court, however, has extended the right of self-definition to contexts that involve other examples of gender identity. In Lawrence v. Texas,
Texas made it a crime for gays to engage in “sodomy.”104 While the crime was
a class C misdemeanor, and hence minor, the Court nonetheless struck it
down.105 Why it did so is illuminating. Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, quoted the language from Casey regarding “the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.”106 This language, he explained, was broad enough to recognize the right
of consenting adults to engage in sexual intimacy: “Persons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”107 Even if the Texas law was only a class C misdemeanor, Justice
Kennedy worried that the law sent a message of “stigma” to gays.108 He stated,
“[t]he stigma this criminal statute imposes . . . is not trivial.”109 As the Casey
plurality had done for women denied the right to an abortion, Justice Kennedy
worried about how such stigma undermined the “dignity” of gays. What was
different in Lawrence was that Justice Kennedy melded the equal protection
analysis with the substantive due process clause.110
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects,
and a decision on the latter point advances both interests. If protected conduct is
100
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made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn
for equal protection reasons.111

Justice Kennedy’s words are important for transgender people. The TSA’s
policy regarding transgender people has the effect of denying “equality of
treatment” to transgender people. Like the law in Lawrence, if the TSA’s policy
is left unexamined for its substantive validity, the stigma that the policy produces on transgender people might remain as well.
III. POLICY PROPOSAL
It is tempting to suggest that TSA should simply allow transgender passengers to instruct TSA officers to press the male/female button that corresponds
with their current anatomy. In the case of Jamii Erway, for example, her penis
was the anatomical anomaly that caused the scanner to issue a false alarm. Because the scanner is only programmed to associate penises with males, Jamii
might have been able to avoid a false alarm if she could have told the TSA officer in advance to press the male button despite her female appearance. However, her lawsuit clearly explains why the scanner’s inclusion of only two gendered buttons—one for male and the other for female—can be insufficient for
transgender people like Jamii:
Could Jamii avoid these troubles by advising the scanner operator of the correct
button to press? It is, unfortunately, not that simple. For one thing, body scanner
operators are often unwilling to take instructions from passengers. But, even if
they were, the male/female button causes other problems. For example, if the
operator presses “female,” the scanner will ignore a small item located in the
center of the traveler’s back, in order to accommodate the fact that women often
have clasps for a bra strap there but men do not. Thus, if one has external genitals and is wearing a bra, there is no button that will accommodate their situation.112

The deficiency in the binary button system applies not only to transgender
women but also to transgender men. Some transgender men elect to undergo
double mastectomy surgeries to remove the breasts that they were born with,
but some of the transgender men who have undergone double mastectomies
might not have undergone phalloplasties or metoidioplasties, two surgical procedures used to construct penises. Because TSA full-body scanners associate a
lack of breasts and the lack of a penis with neither the maleness nor femaleness,
transgender men who possess neither breasts nor penises might trigger a false
alarm.
It seems, therefore, that the most appropriate way to alleviate these problems would be to allow transgender people to circumvent the male/female button system entirely. Currently, TSA’s male/female button system requires of111
112
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ficers and scanners to make a three-pronged set of difficult assumptions about
passengers.113 First, a TSA officer must use elements of a passenger’s appearance (e.g. clothing, hair, and physique) to determine the passenger’s biological
sex.114 Then, after the officer has pressed the button that corresponds to the passenger’s perceived biological sex, the scanner uses the passenger’s perceived
biological sex to expect only certain kinds of external genitalia.115 For many
passengers, each element in this series of assumptions turns out to be correct,
so they can enter and exit a TSA checkpoint smoothly, without false alarms.
For some transgender passengers, however, one or more of these assumptions
might prove to be wrong, and, if it is the final assumption—the assumption
about external genitalia—that is incorrect, this imprecision can lead to embarrassing false alarms, pat-downs, and even strip searches.116
If the aim of the TSA’s male/female button system is to allow full-body
scanners to expect and detect certain external genitalia in certain passengers, a
case can be made that transgender people should be permitted to eliminate assumptions by the TSA officer and to provide information about their anatomies
directly to the body scanners. Specifically, the Essay proposes the creation of a
federal-issued government identification card. This card would contain a computer chip that would allow a transgender passenger to indicate to the body
scanner what genitalia the scanner should expect to detect. Because individuals
with the identification card might not want TSA officers to know explicitly
what genitalia they do or do not possess, the identification card will not, as does
a state-issued driver’s license, list the relevant genitalia that the TSA officer
should expect to find. Instead, the card will display either a bar code or another
encrypted code. When a TSA officer scans this encrypted code, it will program
the body scanner to expect the genitalia that the owner of the identification card
possesses.
Individuals may presumptively obtain the federal identification card if they
can procure documentation from a doctor that fairly describes their genitalia. At
the Department of Motor Vehicles, individuals can apply for the federal identification card by providing this doctor-issued documentation, as well as documents proving name, age, and Social Security number. While the application
process for the federal identification card does require potential applicants to
disclose and document details about their genitalia, the disclosure and documentation necessitated by this process differ fundamentally from the disclosure
and documentation obtained through TSA pat-downs and strip-searches in that
this application process allows individuals to choose the physicians to whom
they disclose the details of their genitals, as well as the specific time of their
disclosure. TSA screening procedures can be distressing for transgender pas-
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sengers because they leave transgender passengers with few choices. They cannot choose by whom they are patted down, nor can they choose when.
If Jamii Erway had enjoyed the benefits of the proposed identification card,
she may never have had to endure the painful consequences of refusing to submit to a strip search by TSA officers. When the TSA officer screening Jamii
Erway told her that she needed to submit to a strip-search, Jamii did not comply; she and her mother left the airport together.117 However, Jamii’s decision
was not without its ramifications. According to the legal complaint filed by Jamii against TSA, “Jamii experienced severe emotional distress, including
symptoms of panic, anxiety, fear, racing heart, shortness of breath, uncontrollable shaking, and nausea,” and, after she and her mother left the airport, they
“drove over 600 miles to return home.”118 If Jamii had obtained and used the
federal identification described in this Essay, there would have been no false
alarm, no pat-down, and no threat of strip-search. She and her mother could
have flown home instead of driving over 600 miles. Just as Jamii was not
unique in her negative experience with TSA screening, she is not unique in the
value that she might have derived from the federal identification card. Many of
the issues that transgender passengers face at TSA checkpoints stem from false
alarms. By using the identification card during the airport security process, a
transgender passenger would not be issued a false alarm for any anomalous
anatomy. Therefore, the passenger need not undergo either a pat-down or a
more invasive search. Further, TSA officers need not worry that they are incorrectly designating passengers as either female or male; the identification card
ensures that the full-body scanner will expect the genitalia that the owner of the
card possesses.
By affording a substantial measure of anonymity to the transgender traveler, the proposed card system will not run the risk of abridging what the Essay
has suggested is the right of privacy by a person to define her gender. To be
sure, the process of obtaining the card may prove inconvenient to some travelers, and perhaps even burdensome to others. Overall, however, the proposal offered by the Essay should be accessible for most transgender people and should
prove far less intrusive than present policies used by the TSA.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS?
Having proffered the proposal for an alternative identification system, this
Essay will examine whether a failure by TSA might amount to a violation of
the Constitution. This Essay suggests that there exists a fundamental right under the substantive due process clause to define one’s gender. The TSA’s present policy could be held a violation of that right. Justices have employed different tests to determine whether a law violates the substantive due process
clause. In Lawrence, for example, a plurality of justices used what appeared to
117
118

Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 6.
Id.

21 NEV. L.J. 1061

1076

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:3

be a heightened version of rational review to strike down Texas’s law.119 In Casey, a plurality of justices introduced the undue burden test to strike down portions of Pennsylvania’s law regulating abortion.120 In Roe, the Court used strict
scrutiny.121 Regardless of the chosen test, the Court has suggested that a law
that abridges a fundamental right bears a heavy responsibility to justify its existence. The TSA’s concern for public safety is clearly valid, especially in light
of 9/11. However, it is not clear whether the screening policy adopted by the
TSA is equally justified given that the alternative policy limned by this Essay
can in theory be implemented. Therefore, under substantive due process considerations, the TSA’s present policy should probably be struck down.
A similar problem exists for the TSA when its present policy is subject to
Fourth Amendment analysis. Under the Fourth Amendment, the government
may not engage in unreasonable search and seizure.122 According to the Supreme Court, the amendment requires the government to show that there was a
warrant for the search or that there existed individualized suspicion.123 The Supreme Court, however, has created an exception for searches deemed to be
“administrative.”124 Administrative searches are those which take place “where
the risk to public safety is substantial and real.”125 For administrative searches,
“blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports and entrances to courts and
other official buildings.”126 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals offered a useful
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s statement regarding administrative
searches:
We have held that airport screening searches, like the one at issue here, are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches because they are “conducted as
part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose,
namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and
thereby to prevent hijackings.”127
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While the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant, the Ninth Circuit
qualified that “the scope of such searches is not limitless.”128 The Ninth Circuit
elaborated: “A particular airport security screening search is constitutionally
reasonable provided that it ‘is no more extensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives [] [and] that it
is confined in good faith to that purpose.’ ”129
Jonathan Corbett, the attorney for Jamii Erway, asserted in the latter’s legal
complaint that “the administrative search doctrine allows for only extremely
limited, narrowly-tailored searches in furtherance of a regulatory scheme.”130
While not identical to the language used by the Ninth Circuit, Corbett’s language was quite similar. On the other hand, the First Circuit adopted a much
more relaxed test:
While we will not require the government to adopt the least intrusive practicable
alternative, there must be a fairly close fit between the weight of the government’s interest in searching and the intrusiveness of the search—that is, the
search must be a “reasonably effective means” for furthering the important government interest.131

Unlike Corbett and the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit has adopted a “balancing test:” “In a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search like that at issue
here, we assess the search’s reasonableness by balancing ‘the public interest in
the [TSA’s search] program against the privacy concerns implicated by the’
search.”132 Trying to resolve which approach is better—the balancing approach
or one that is “no more extensive than necessary”—is beyond the scope of this
Essay.
What this Essay can do is clarify the unique ways in which a TSA body
search can prove especially invasive for transgender people, regardless of
whether a given court decides to light upon the balancing approach or the “no
more than necessary” approach. As explained in Part III, the policies adopted
by TSA can have the effect of causing great emotional injury to transgender
persons to such a degree that it may engender one of the following unwelcome
outcomes. One, the TSA’s policy may cause those contemplating gender transition to quash their yearning to realize their true gender. Two, the TSA’s policy
may cause those who have already undertaken some form of gender transition
to forego its completion. Three, the TSA’s policy, by subjecting transgender
people to regular forms of public humiliation, may cause them to consider selfharm and suicide. Or, four, the TSA’s policy may cause transgender people to
avoid traveling by airplane, an unrealistic alternative for many people. Any of
these scenarios, standing alone, might suffice as an unjustifiable burden on
what this Essay has suggested is a substantive right to determine one’s gender.
128
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The analysis under substantive due process would seem conceptually removed from the aims of criminal procedure in the Fourth Amendment. Yet the
conclusions regarding the former can inform analysis under the latter. The
Fourth Amendment seeks to protect people from an unreasonable invasion of
privacy by the government. Justice Brandeis in Olmstead had explained that the
purpose of the right of privacy was to protect “the right to be let alone—the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”133
The right of privacy as valued by transgender people is meant to protect their
efforts to define themselves. Given the significance of the right at stake, the
analysis under the Fourth Amendment must consider whether there exists alternative means available to the TSA to promote public safety at airports. As this
Essay has limned, such a means exists in the proposed card identification system. v
V. THE ROLE OF RACE
The theme organizing the symposium in which this Essay appears centers
on the relationship between criminal law and gender and race. This Essay has
not dwelt on the relationship between race and transgender in the context of
TSA searches because there is insufficient data to make any meaningful conclusions. Based on publicly available data, we do not know how many
transgender people, according to their race, were subject to invasive searches
by the TSA. Should such data materialize, the Supreme Court has furnished a
means of analyzing it in terms of the principle of equal protection. The TSA’s
policy does not, on its face, discriminate against people on the basis of race.
Suppose, however, that new data shows the TSA’s policy as having disproportionately affected transgender people of a particular race. In that case, a disparate impact analysis can be applied.134 The Court can examine whether there is
evidence that the TSA’s policy is applied in a racially-motivated manner or
whether there are aspects of the policy that lend themselves to racial discrimination. If either can be proven, the TSA’s policy, as applied or on its face, will
be subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection principle of the Fifth
Amendment’s due process clause. At that point, the law will likely be struck
down.135 Disparate impact analysis thus can have the effect of disaggregating
race from gender or transgender.
The benefit of disparate impact analysis is also a defect, however. The benefit is that disparate impact analysis can isolate ascriptive elements—race from
transgender—and thus enable the Court to apply an analysis to one element.
However, this benefit can also serve as the problem. Disparate impact analysis
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fails to account for instances of intersectionality.136 Disparate impact analysis is
meant to weed out instances where the law discriminates on the basis of race
and where the law discriminates on the basis of transgender identity, but not
where there is a convergence of both.137 That is, while disparate impact analysis
can, in theory, isolate racial discrimination from transgender discrimination, the
analysis is unable to identify instances where a person is discriminated by the
TSA owing to her racial identity and her transgender identity. How to examine
discrimination that affects such convergent identities is worthy of future scholarship.
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